Fulton v. City of Philadelphia and Its Implications for First Amendment Jurisprudence and LGBTQ Civil Rights by Kohut, Jonathan E.
Seton Hall University 
eRepository @ Seton Hall 
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law 
2021 
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia and Its Implications for First 
Amendment Jurisprudence and LGBTQ Civil Rights 
Jonathan E. Kohut 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship 
 Part of the Law Commons 
 2 
I. Introduction 
The United States has a well-noted history of systemic oppression of minority groups which 
has, at times, been exacerbated by our system of law. The Lesbian-Gay-Bisexual-Transsexual-
Queer (hereinafter referred to as “LGBTQ”) community is no exception. One of the key issues for 
the LGBTQ community, as it relates to the law, is that its lifestyles are often at odds with the 
sincerely held religious beliefs of other individuals throughout the country and across the religious 
spectrum. In this paper, I will look at the history of the civil rights battle for LGBTQ individuals, 
the victories and defeats that community has experienced in the judicial system, and how the 
Supreme Court’s upcoming decision in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia1 could have dire 
consequences for the civil rights of LGBTQ individuals moving forward.  
Section I of this paper will look at the history of LGBTQ civil rights in the United States 
and the relevant legal precedents shaping First Amendment jurisprudence. Section II will look 
more closely at those precedents, and the narrowing of same over the past several decades. Section 
III will look at the possible fallout from the Court’s upcoming decision in Fulton along with the 
consequences it could have on LGBTQ civil rights. 
a. A Brief History of Civil Rights for Minorities of Sexual Orientation 
“I know that you cannot live on hope alone, but without it, life is not worth living. And you 
… and you … and you … have got to give them hope.”2 When Harvey Milk uttered these words 
in 1978, he had just become the first openly-gay individual to be elected to public office in the 
United States.3 Though an ever-present source of inspiration, the fate of Harvey Milk, who was 
assassinated shortly after delivering his “You Cannot Live On Hope Alone” speech in 1978, 
 
1 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted 140 S.Ct. 1104 (2020). 
2 Harvey Milk, YOU CANNOT LIVE ON HOPE ALONE (1978). 
3 The Official HARVEY MILK Biography. Official Biography of Harvey Milk, MilkFoundation.org (Oct. 19, 2020). 
http://milkfoundation.org/about/harvey-milk-biography/. 
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remains a stark reminder of the prejudices and outright dangers faced by the LGBTQ community 
in the United States.4 The struggle and fight for equality and recognized civil rights has been a 
staple of LGBTQ culture in the United States since before Harvey Milk who, through his campaign 
and election to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, elevated the struggles of LGBTQ 
individuals to the public discourse in the 1970s.5 
Prior to the rise-and-fall of Harvey Milk, the United States was forced to face the reality of 
what it means to be an LGBTQ individual in this country thanks to the Stonewall Riots of 1969. 
This event precipitated when members of the New York Police Department raided the Stonewall 
Inn, a popular meeting place for LGBTQ individuals living in New York City, primarily gay men. 
This use of police force ignited a riot amongst New York’s LGBTQ community, where “for the 
first time, the gay community rose up to protest being targeted by law enforcement and society for 
its lifestyle.”6 Since the era of Milk and Stonewall, the fight for equality by and for the LGBTQ 
community has steadily continued, as has the marginalization of the group through events like the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic of the 1980s/90s and the United States military’s implementation of the 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy in 1993.  
Along with societal events like the Stonewall Riots, the LGBTQ community’s fight was 
also spurred on by judicial opinions tending to restrict the civil rights of LGBTQ individuals. One 
glaring example is the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick.7 At issue in Bowers was 
a Georgia statute which criminalized the sexual practice of sodomy.8 A homosexual man 
challenged the law in the district court after he was charged with violating same when he was 
 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Heritage of Pride, Inc. v. Matinee NYC, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 4165 (CM), 2014 WL 12783866, *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 
2014). 
7 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
8 Id. at 187-88. 
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caught committing the act of sodomy with another man in his own bedroom.9 Plaintiff argued that 
the law put him in imminent danger of arrest as a practicing homosexual, and was violative of the 
Due Process Clause under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution.10 
The Court disagreed, holding that there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy 
imbedded in the Constitution, nor is homosexual sodomy a protectable act when done in the 
privacy of one’s own home.11  
Congress dealt another blow to LGBTQ rights with the passage of the Defense of Marriage 
Act (“DOMA”)12 in 1996. The initial bill, which was signed into law by Democratic President Bill 
Clinton, affirmed the rights of states to refuse to acknowledge the marriage of same-sex couples, 
regardless of the validity of that union in any other state or territory.13 Around the same time 
Congress passed DOMA, states took steps to codify marriage laws in line with same. Following a 
decision by the Supreme Court of Hawaii holding that the State’s refusal to grant marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples was discriminatory14, Hawaiians voted to approve a constitutional amendment 
granting the Hawaiian Legislature the power to reserve marriage for opposite-sex couples.15  
Not all developments in the arena of LGBTQ legal rights were negative, though. Despite 
Hawaiian voters outlawing same-sex marriage through a constitutional amendment, Hawaii also 
became one of the first states to officially recognize limited legal same-sex unions, or civil 
 
9 Id. at 186. 
10 Id. at 188, 192. 
11 Id. at 192-96. The Court distinguished this case from Stanley v. Georgia , 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969), “where the 
Court held that the First Amendment prevents conviction for possessing or reading obscene material in the privacy of 
one’s home.” Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195. The Bowers Court noted that the Stanley decision specifically pointed out that 
it was not meant to offer protection for all illegal activities done in one’s home. Id., citing Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568, 
n.11. The Court then, as a sign of the times, compares extending the Stanley holding to consensual homosexual 
conduct would be analogous to expanding it to actions like incest “and other sexual crimes”. Id. at 195-96. 
12 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
13 Id. 
14 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
15 Mark Niesse. Hawaii is latest civil unions battleground, Feb. 22, 2009, ASSOCIATED PRESS. 
https://www.southcoasttoday.com/article/20090223/NEWS/902230346 . 
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unions.16 In total, five states passed laws recognizing civil unions between same-sex couples,  
including Colorado, Illinois, Vermont, and New Jersey.17 
b. A Growing Trend Towards the Expansion of Civil Rights for LGBTQ Individuals 
In 2003, it appeared that the proverbial tide was continuing to turn in favor of expanding 
the civil rights of LGBTQ individuals when the United States Supreme Court handed down its 
landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas18, wherein the Court held that a Texas statute 
criminalizing certain consensual sexual activities between same-sex partners was a violation of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus overruling the Court’s previous decision 
in Bowers.19 Following the Lawrence decision, the Court took up the issue of DOMA’s 
constitutionality in U.S. v. Windsor.20 Interpreting DOMA under both due process and equal 
protection principles21, the Court held that DOMA’s definition of marriage was unconstitutional.22 
 Then, in 2015, arguably the single most prominent event in the fight for LGBTQ equality 
occurred when the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges.23 At issue in Obergefell were 
challenges to several state statutes prohibiting same-sex marriage.24 The Court ultimately found 
those laws to be unconstitutional, holding that, as Justice Kennedy so elegantly and succinctly put 
it in the majority opinion, “the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the 
person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
16 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572B-2. 
17 “Civil Unions and Domestic Partnership Statutes,” National Conference of State Legislatures, Mar. 10, 2020, 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/civil-unions-and-domestic-partnership-statutes.aspx. 
18 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003). 
19 Id. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding 
precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”) 
20 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
21 Id. at 769-70 (“DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to protect. By doing so it violates basic due 
process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government.”) (citations omitted) . 
22 Id. at 775 (“The federal statute is invalid , for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage 
and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”) . 
23 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
24 Id. 
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couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court now holds 
that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be 
denied to them.”25 For the first time in American history, State governments could no longer 
prohibit marriage between two consenting adults, regardless of their genders. 
With the momentous majority opinion came a scathing dissent penned by Chief Justice 
John Roberts, who was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.26 Roberts 
acknowledges the growing popularity of acknowledging same-sex marriages, as well as the social 
policy and considerations of fairness supporting the majority opinion.27 Roberts follows that 
acknowledgment by making clear that “[w]hether same-sex marriage is a good idea should be of 
no concern to [the Court].”28 The dissent goes on to criticize the majority’s decision as “an act of 
will, not legal judgement[,]”29 before tying the issue back to issues of religious liberty and free 
exercise under the First Amendment. Roberts argues that the majority’s opinion infringes on the 
free exercise rights of some religious individuals, and then he plays the role of soothsayer, 
predicting that there may a situation where “a religious adoption agency declines to place children 
with same-sex married couples[,]” comes before the Court in the future.30 
Just this year, the Supreme Court handed down another momentous decision as it pertains 
 
25 Id. at 675. Prior to the Court’s decision in Obergefell, 17 states had passed laws legalizing marriage between 
members of the same sex. In addition, same-sex marriage was legal in 21 states pursuant to a federal court ruling. 
Bill Chappel. Supreme Court Declares Same-Sex Marriage Legal In All 50 States, National Public Radio, June 26, 
2015, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/26/417717613/supreme-court-rules-all-states-must-allow-
same-sex-marriages. Prior to Obergefell, there were also issues with states refusing to give full faith and credit to 
same-sex marriages performed outside of the state pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV § 
1. In an article written for the Stanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Joseph Willia m Singer argues that 
DOMA is unconstitutional insomuch as it effectively allowed Congress to reverse the principles of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause through statute. 
26 576 U.S. at 686 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 687. 
30 Id. at 711-12. 
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to the civil rights of LGBTQ individuals in Bostock v. Clayton County, Ga.31 In Bostock, plaintiff 
Gerald Bostock brought suit against the county for which he was a child welfare advocate when 
he was terminated after his employer became aware of the fact that he joined a gay-men’s 
recreational softball league.32 In a 6-3 decision, written by conservative Justice Neil Gorsuch, the 
Court held that Title VII prohibits an employer from terminating someone based solely on the fact 
that that person is gay or transgender.33 According to the Majority, Title VII’s “message for our 
cases is equally simple and momentous: An individual's homosexuality or transgender status is not 
relevant to employment decisions. That's because it is impossible to discriminate against a person 
for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on 
sex.”34 On the heels of Obergefell, the LGBTQ community won another major victory in the area 
of civil rights. What’s more, the decision was a resounding one (6-3) in an era where narrow 5-4 
decisions have become increasingly common.35  
However, along with another victory for the LGBTQ community in Bostock came another 
scathing dissent from a conservative Justice, indicating the desire from that wing of the Court to 
snuff out the growing trend away from religious liberty and towards expanding civil rights for 
LGBTQ Americans. In dissent, Justice Samuel Alito stated: 
Briefs filed by a wide range of religious groups—Christian, Jewish, and Muslim—
express deep concern that the positions now adopted by the Court ‘will trigger open 
conflict with faith-based employment practices of numerous churches, synagogues, 
 
31 140 S.Ct. 1731 (2020). 
32 Id. at 1734. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 1741. 
35 After the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, and the Senate’s confirmation of Neil Gorsuch to the Court, one -vote 
decisions increased from roughly 5% of Supreme Court decisions during the 2016 -2017 term, to roughly 20% during 
the 2017-2018 term. See Fu, Yiqin. “What Percentage of U.S. Supreme Court Cases are Decided 5 -4, and Which 
Justices Vote Together Most Often? A Review of Historical and 2017 -2018 Term Data” (July 10, 2018). 
https://yiqinfu.github.io/posts/supreme-court-kennedy-retirement-ot2017/. But see, Bostock, 140 S.Ct. at 1778 (Alito, 
J. dissenting) (“As the briefing in these cases has warned, the position that the Court now adopts will threaten freedom 
of religion, freedom of speech, and personal privacy and safety. No one should think that the Cou rt's decision 
represents an unalloyed victory for individual liberty.”). 
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mosques, and other religious institutions.’ They argue that ‘[r]eligious 
organizations need employees who actually live the faith,’ and that compelling a 
religious organization to employ individuals whose conduct flouts the tenets of the 
organization’s faith forces the group to communicate an objectionable message.36 
 
The strong words of Justice Alito’s dissent succinctly encapsulate the issue underlying all of the 
aforementioned case law which expanded civil rights for LGBTQ individuals. While a strong 
argument can be made for expanding the rights of the LGBTQ community, and equally convincing 
constitutional argument can be made for the religious liberties of those in opposition to the LGBTQ 
lifestyle. This juxtaposition in views continues to drive this kind of First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
c. LGBTQ Rights Take a Hit With the Court’s Decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop 
Though the Court’s decisions in both Obergefell and Bostock represented major victories 
for the LGBTQ community in the realm of civil rights and personal liberties, not all recent 
decisions by the Court have been positive advancements like the two aforementioned opinions. 
Just three short years after the Court’s landmark decision in Obergefell, the Court dealt a blow to 
LGBTQ individuals and advocates through its decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado 
Civil Rights Comm’n.37 The Court’s Masterpiece Cakeshop decision is perhaps even more relevant 
to this thesis, as that case dealt squarely with the rights of LGBTQ individuals versus the First 
Amendment rights granted to religious individuals through the Free Exercise Clause.38  
While the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop did reaffirm the fact that LGBTQ individuals 
are afforded civil rights protections under the United States Constitution, the case also stood for 
the proposition that the Free Exercise Clause remains a relevant consideration for the Court when 
 
36 Id. at 1780. 
37 138 S.Ct. 1719 (2018). 
38 This is, admittedly, hyperbolic. The issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop was really between the First Amendment rights 
of religious business owners and the right of a State to pass laws prohibiting private businesses from denying their 
services to LGBTQ individuals. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S.Ct. at 1720. 
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interpreting the constitutional rights of the LGBTQ community, even with the recent gains in 
employment and marriage rights through Bostock and Obergefell. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the 
Court had to analyze the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), 
which prohibits, as relevant here, discrimination based on sexual orientation in a place providing 
public accommodation.39 The Act defines “public accommodation” to include any “place of 
business engaged in any sales to the public and any place offerings services … to the public,” 
while expressly excluding from this definition “a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that 
is principally used for religious purposes.”40 Despite the State’s attempt to, presumably, make the 
law more neutrally applicable by specifically excluding religious houses of worship from the 
definition of “public accommodation”, the statute was challenged on religious grounds by Jack 
Phillips, an expert baker who became the subject of legal scrutiny under the law when he refused 
to bake a cake for the wedding of a gay couple, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins, citing his religious 
opposition to same-sex marriage.41 Because the validity of the Colorado law was being challenged 
under the Free Exercise Clause, the Court had to determine whether it was appropriate to rule on 
the law under the standard espoused by the Court in its landmark 1990 decision, Employment Div., 
Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.42 
d. The Standards of Review: Deciding Masterpiece Cakeshop and Setting the Stage 
for Fulton 
 
1. The Smith Standard of Review 
Respondents in Masterpiece Cakeshop, which included the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission, argued that the Act should be judged under the standard of review laid out by the 
 
39 Id. at 1725. 
40 Id., quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601(1) (emphasis added). 
41 Id. at 1725-26. 
42 494 U.S. 872, 872-73 (1990). 
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Court in Smith, which an Administrative Law Judge in Colorado relied on to rule that the Act did 
not violate the First Amendment rights of Petitioner Phillips.43  The Court in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop ultimately held that the Civil Rights Commission failed to act in a neutral manner 
towards Phillips when it determined probable cause for a violation of the Act and referred the case 
to an Administrative Law Judge.44  
In Smith, the Court, through an opinion authored by the late-Justice Antonin Scalia, held 
that one’s right to free exercise of religion does not relieve that individual from complying with 
neutral laws of general applicability, so long as the law in question does not violate some other 
Constitutional protections.45  In holding that a free exercise argument cannot overcome neutral 
laws of general applicability barring some other encroachment on Constitutional rights, the Smith 
Court rejected the strict scrutiny standard it adopted in Sherbert v. Verner.46 Under Sherbert, any 
law or governmental action that substantially burdens a religious practice must be justified by a 
compelling government interest, which is accomplished through the least restrictive means.47 
Before the Court’s decision in Smith, the strict scrutiny test developed in Sherbert was the standard 
whenever a governmental action was challenged on free exercise grounds, and many legal scholars 
and even casual observers probably assumed it would be the standard used by the Court in Smith, 
especially considering that the two cases had analogous sets of facts: both cases dealt with 
challenges to State unemployment compensation rules brought under the Free Exercise Clause.48  
 
43 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S.Ct. at 1726-27. 
44 Id. at 1731. 
45 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-83. 
46 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
47 Id. at 402-03. 
48 See id. at 399-400 (challenging the validity of a South Carolina unemployment rule which effectively required 
appellant to accept work on a Saturday against her religion). See also Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (challenging an Oregon  
decision permitting the State to deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their employment for religious 
use of peyote). Another reason why the Smith decision was so unexpected is that neither side briefed the Supreme 
Court on the prospect of abandoning the compelling interest  test in favor of a new test applicable to neutral laws of 
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The Court in Smith admitted that its Sherbert holding meant that the State “could not 
condition the availability of unemployment insurance on an individual’s willingness to forgo 
conduct required by his religion.”49 The Court distinguished the facts of Sherbert, though, 
observing that the “conduct at issue in [Sherbert] was not prohibited by law.”50 The Oregon 
Supreme Court confirmed that the State generally prohibits the religious use of peyote (i.e. not just 
in the context of unemployment benefits).51 As such, the Court focused its Free Exercise inquiry 
on Oregon’s prohibition of peyote for religious purposes, and not on its unemployment rules.52 
The Court used this opportunity, brought about by its clever legal maneuvering, to explain 
that the “Sherbert Test” had never been used to invalidate a governmental action in any context 
outside of unemployment rules which conditioned eligibility on an “applicant’s willingness to 
work under conditions forbidden by his religion.”53 The Court did not, however, decide to overturn 
Sherbert. Rather, the Court found that Sherbert and its progeny Thomas v. Rev. Bd. Of Ind. Emp. 
Sec. Div.,54 and Hobbie v. Unemp. Appeals Comm’n of Fla.,55 were limited to a narrow set of 
cases, including when the government has a discretionary system of “individualized … 
assessment.” Smith.56 In fact, the “Sherbert Test” is still used by courts today when interpreting 
such claims.57 Regardless, Smith was, and still is, the standard for analyzing Free Exercise 
 
general applicability. See Michael P. Farris & Jordan W. Lawrence, Employment Division v. Smith and the Need for 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 6 Regent U. L. Rev. 65, 72 n. 27 (1995). 
49 Id. at 876. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 883. 
54 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
55 480 U.S. 136 (1987). 
56 494 U.S. at 873. The Court reasoned that applying Sherbert to a broad array of cases beyond this set of cases where 
the government has a discretionary system of “individualized … assessment[]” would “make the professed doctrines 
of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect … permit every cit izen to become a law unto himself.” 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, quoting Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878). 
57 Just this year, the Eastern District of Washington relied on Sherbert’s strict scrutiny standard to determine whether 
a decision by the Washington Department of Children, Youth, and Families to deny a foster care license to a child’s 
great-grandparents violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Blais v. Hunter, No. 2:20-cv-00187-SMJ, 
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challenges to neutral laws of general applicability. Further, the Court retains strict scrutiny where 
the facts of a case raise issues relating to the Free Exercise Clause and some other constitutional 
right.58 Put differently, so long as a law does not specifically target a religion/religious practice, 
does not involve an individualized assessment, and it does infringe upon any other Constitutional 
rights, that law will pass First Amendment muster.  
The Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop veered away from applying Smith, and instead found 
that the Colorado law unfairly targeted religious people like Jack Phillips, the baker behind the 
initial controversy. The Court stated that “[t]he neutral and respectful consideration to which 
Phillips was entitled was compromised here, however. The Civil Rights Commission’s treatment 
of his case has some elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious 
beliefs that motivated his objection [to making the cake].”59 Pursuant to this finding, the Court 
applied the standard set forth by it in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah 60 
where the Court held that, where a law is not neutral, that law “is invalid unless it is justified by a 
 
2020 WL 5960687 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 8, 2020). Ironically, plaintiffs in that case were Seventh-day Adventists, like the 
plaintiff in Sherbert, and were challenging the State’s decision to deny their foster license based on an answer they 
provided regarding how they would react if their great-granddaughter came out to them as transexual. Id. at *1. The 
State denied plaintiff’s application, citing the State’s “policy to support LGBTQ+ children.” Id. Under the “Sherbert 
Test”, the court held that the State could not show “that it lacks other ways to achieve  its desired goal without imposing 
a substantial burden on the [plaintiffs’] exercise of religion.” Id. at *11. Ultimately, while plaintiffs met the burden to 
be granted a preliminary injunction in the matter, the court refused to “enjoin the [State] from taking LGBTQ+ 
considerations into account when reviewing foster care license applications” so long as answers to such 
“hypotheticals” are not the “sole determining factor when an applicant expresses sincerely held religious beliefs.” Id. 
at *12.  
58 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) as an example of such a case 
involving “the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with … freedom of speech” where the strict scrutiny standard 
should still apply). 
59 Id. at 1729. 
60 508 U.S. 520 (1993). In Lukumi, the plaintiff was a church which practiced the Afro-Caribbean religion Santeria. 
The church challenged several local ordinances enacted in the city council of Hialeah, Florida, which addressed the 
killing of animals for religious sacrifices, a  practice adhered to by the church. The Court held that the Hialeah 
ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable, as they unfairly targeted the Santerían church. Because the 
laws were not neutral or generally applicable, the city had to show that it had a compelling interest, and that the laws 
were narrowly tailored to meet that end. The Court held that Hialeah could not meet this burden, so the laws prohibiting 
animal sacrifice did not pass muster under a strict scrutiny sta ndard. See id. 
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compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”61 This lack of neutrality 
pulled the actions of Colorado in Masterpiece Cakeshop out of the realm of the Smith doctrine.62 
2. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
Smith was seen as a devastating blow to religious freedom of exercise in the United States, 
and in the decades since the decision it has come under harsh scrutiny from judges and legal 
scholars on both sides of the ideological aisle, a topic which will be discussed at length below. 
Though members of Congress were upset about the Court’s decision as well, Congress was not 
without some recourse. In 1993, just three years after the Smith decision was handed down, 
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 
“RFRA”).63 By and through RFRA, Congress codified the review standard espoused by the Court 
in Sherbert. The statute states that the “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. . . .”64 A 
substantial burden legally imposed by the Government is only allowed if the Government can show 
that the law in question “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the 
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”65 Based on the plain 
language of the statute, it was clear that Congress’ intent was to skirt the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Smith, and restore the freedom of religion enjoyed under Sherbert.66 
 
61 Id. at 533. 
62 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S.Ct. at 1729 (“On these facts, the Court must draw the inference that Phillips’ 
religious objection was not considered with the neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause requires.”)  
63 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. 
64 Id. at § 2000bb-1(a) (emphasis added). 
65 Id. at § 2000bb-1(b)(1)-(2). 
66 The intent of Congress was explicitly stated in S.Rep. No. 103-111 (1993). In that Report, the Committee on the 
Judiciary wrote in favor the passage of the RFRA, citing the issues it saw with the Smith decision, which it 
acknowledged “dramatically weakened the constitutional protection for freedom of religion.” Id. at 5. The Report 
went on to hyperbolically claim that “[s]ince Smith was decided, governments throughout the U.S. have run roughshod 
over religious convictions.” Id. at 8. The Committee then addressed the Court’s decisions in Sherbert and Wisconsin  
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), both of which supported the strict scrutiny standard for Free Exercise claims, 
definitively stating that it was “necessary to restore th[e] [Sherbert] test to preserve religious freedom.” S.Rep. No. 
103-111 at 14. 
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Though Congress attempted to create legislation totally abrogating Smith and restoring the 
strict scrutiny standard for Free Exercise claims, the Supreme Court handed them another blow in 
City of Boerne v. Flores.67 Flores concerned the City of Boerne’s decision to deny a church a 
building permit, which the church challenged under RFRA.68 The issue before the Court, however, 
was not a substantive one under the strict scrutiny test. Rather, the Court had to determine whether 
Congress had the power to apply RFRA to the States through its Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement power.69 The Court found that RFRA is a piece of remedial, preventative legislation, 
which may be appropriate under the enforcement clause when there is “a congruence between the 
means used and the ends to be achieved.”70 RFRA, the Court held, “is so out of proportion to a 
supposed remedial or preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed 
to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”71 Based on what the Court perceived as the “[s]weeping 
coverage” of RFRA, the Court held that RFRA exceeds Congress’ enforcement power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, “contradict[ing] vital principles necessary to maintain separation of 
powers and the federal balance.”72 
The Flores holding meant that Smith was back, though in a more limited way. Flores did 
not stand for the proposition that RFRA is unconstitutional; but that it is unconstitutional as applied 
to state and local governments.73 While the revival of Smith was another loss for religious rights 
under the First Amendment, it is by no means the last word on the subject. Spurred by the Court’s 
 
67 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
68 Id. at 511. 
69 Id. at 516-17. 
70 Id. at 530. 
71 Id. at 532. 
72 Id. at 532, 534-36. 
73 Courts still apply RFRA to federal laws and law enforcement. See e.g., Gonzalez v. O Centro Beneficente Uniao 
do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (holding that the federal government failed to demonstrate a “compelling interest in 
barring” a religious group’s sacramental use of psychedelic hoasca as required under 42 U.S.C. 2000bb -1(b)(1)). 
 15 
decision in Flores, 21 states have since passed into law their own version of RFRA.74 At first, these 
state RFRAs were embraced by a bi-partisan coalition who praised these laws for providing 
increased protections for religious individuals.75As more states began proposing RFRAs, however, 
the bi-partisan coalition began to shrink, and in its place grew a deep divide between conservative 
and liberal politicians, with many Democratic politicians reconceiving these laws as a shield for 
religiously motivated discrimination against members of the LGBTQ community.76 As the partisan 
divide grows within states legislatures, however, state courts have taken up the task of expanding 
protections for religious individuals in the absence legislation geared towards that aim.77 
3. Introducing Fulton and the (Possible) Abrogation of Smith 
The proliferation of state RFRAs aside, the Smith standard is now the standard of review 
for claims of Free Exercise infringement brought pursuant to neutral state laws of general 
applicability. However, regardless of what the Court has said regarding the doctrine of stare decisis 
in the past, the Smith standard is not set in stone. In fact, the Court will be faced with an opportunity 
to revisit and possibly overturn its Smith decision when it hears arguments in Fulton v. City of 
Philadelphia.78 Fulton, both for the Court and for this thesis, may represent the “perfect storm” of 
facts: a Free Exercise challenge to a neutral law of general applicability, with the direct benefactors 
of the law being LGBTQ individuals.  
 
74 “State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts,” National Conference of State Legislatures, May 4, 2017, 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx. 
75 See Nicholas P. Miller & Nathan Sheers, Religious Free Exercise Under State Constitutions, 34 J. Church & St. 
303, n. 101 (1992). 
76 See Paul Baumgardner & Brian K. Miller, Moving From Statehouses to the State Courts? The Post-RFRA Future 
of State Religious Freedom Protections, 82 Alb. L. Rev. 1385, 1407 (2019). 
77 See e.g. Mitchell Cty. V. Zimmerman, 810 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2012) (In Iowa, the rare Midwest state that does not 
have its own version of RFRA, the Supreme Court expanded protections for religious individuals by finding that Smith 
does not define the parameters of what is a neutral law of general applicability, and  holding that “the Free Exercise 
Clause … forbid[s] the situation where the government accommodates secular interests while denying accommodation 
for comparable religious interests.” The Court used this interpretation of Smith to strike down a seemingly neutral law 
of general applicability which did not contain accommodations for members of the local Mennonite community); see 
also Baumgardner at 1403-04. 
78 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted 140 S.Ct. 1104 (2020). 
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The facts giving rise to Fulton are uncomplicated. The City of Philadelphia’s Department 
of Human Services works with independent foster care agencies, to which the City refers foster 
children.79 When the City learned that two agencies it worked with refused to work with same-sex 
couples as foster parents, the City determined this was a violation of its anti-discrimination laws.80 
In turn, the City stopped referring foster children to those agencies.81 One of those agencies, 
Catholic Social Services (hereinafter referred to as “CSS”), brought suit against the City, alleging, 
in part, that the City violated its Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment.82 CSS motioned 
for a preliminary injunction.83 
Like the facts of the case, the Third Circuit’s analysis of the First Amendment issue was 
also straightforward and uncomplicated. Relying on Smith, the Third Circuit set out to determine 
whether Philadelphia’s anti-discrimination laws did violate CSS’ Free Exercise rights. Applying 
the Smith framework, the court held that “[t]he City’s nondiscrimination policy is a neutral, 
generally applicable law, and the religious views of CSS do not entitle it to an exception from that 
policy.”84 CSS relied on Masterpiece Cakeshop and Lukumi arguing that an “ostensibly neutral 
government action” may be unconstitutional where that action “is motivated by ill will toward a 
specific religious group or otherwise impermissibly targeted religious conduct.”85 While the Third 
Circuit acknowledged that these cases do correctly stand for such a proposition86, the 
 
79 Fulton, 922 F.3d at 146. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 147, citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78. 
85 Fulton, 922 F.3d at 153-54. 
86 The Third Circuit focused this discussion primarily on Lukumi, where the court acknowledged that “[t]he focus on 
different treatment of religious and secular conduct [was] clear. . . .” Fulton, 922 F.3d at 154. In Lukumi, the City of 
Hialeah, Florida adopted a city ordinance prohibiting the slaughtering of animals except in certain circumstances. The 
history surrounding the ordinance, however, made it clear that the law was not meant to protect animal welfare, but 
rather was an attempt to suppress the practice of Santeria, a  religion which began to pop up in the City due to Cuban 
immigration to the area. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 524. Emergency sessions leading to the ordinance were rife with hostility 
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circumstances presented to the Third Circuit in Fulton were distinguishable. At the end of the day, 
the court determined that Philadelphia’s antidiscrimination policies were neutral laws of general 
applicability, “[a]nd while CSS [asserts] that the City’s actions were not driven by a sincere 
commitment to equality but rather by antireligious and anti-Catholic bias … the current record 
does not show religious prosecution or bias.”87 
The decision in Fulton seems, in light of Smith, as well as more recent cases like 
Masterpiece Cakeshop and Lukumi, rather unsurprising. So why, then, has the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to review the Third Circuit’s decision?88 In short, because Smith is ripe for 
revisitation, and Fulton may the opportunity the Court has been waiting for to do just that. 
In this paper, I will look at how the Supreme Court will likely decide the First Amendment 
issue in Fulton as it pertains to the Court’s decision in Smith, as well as what a decision overturning 
Smith in favor of the strict scrutiny standard embraced by RFRA could mean for the civil rights of 
the LGBTQ community. 
II.   The Supreme Court’s Narrowing of the Smith Doctrine 
When taking all relevant factors into account, it is probable that the Supreme Court will 
use its decision in Fulton to overturn Smith and apply the strict scrutiny standard championed by 
RFRA to neutral laws of general applicability in all cases implicating the Free Exercise Clause. 
This theory is based on several factors, including the disfavor of Smith among conservative 
Justices and legal scholars, the Court’s current ideological balance, and the facts in Fulton giving 
rise to a prime opportunity to create new precedent in line with those ideologies.  
 
 
towards the religion. Id. Moreover, the ordinance itself prohibited animal slaughter only for “sacrifice” in the limited 
context of “a public or private ceremony.” Id. at 527. 
87 Id. at 165. 
88 See 140 S.Ct. at 1104. 
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a. The Smith Framework Has Been Disfavored By Conservative Justices Since It Was 
Handed Down In 1990 
 
Perhaps one of the most oxymoronic things a person with even a shred of knowledge about 
Supreme Court jurisprudence can hear is the fact that a Supreme Court decision, written by the 
late-Justice Antonin Scalia, is highly disfavored amongst conservative jurists and legal thinkers. 
However, that is exactly the case with Smith. While Justice Scalia was a well-established  
conservative on the Court89, the decision he authored in Smith has long been the ire of conservative 
thinkers; a major reason why the Supreme Court, with its modern-day heavy conservative leaning, 
will likely overturn the Smith precedent in the coming months. 
Before discussing the opinion of our current Justices as it pertains to Smith, it is worth 
noting that the Smith decision has been experiencing pushback since it was handed down in 1990, 
from both the liberal-wing of the Court and, perhaps more surprisingly, the conservative-wing. 
Within the Smith decision itself, Justice Harry Blackmun90 penned a scathing dissent wherein 
Blackmun advocated for the compelling interest standard to apply to the Oregon law at issue91 
Blackmun also went on to acknowledge that, based on his legal calculations, Oregon could not 
have met such a burden in Smith.92 Justice Blackmun goes even further, accusing the State of 
 
89 See Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice of the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, New York Times, Feb. 13, 2016. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html. In the Times obituary, Justice Scalia is described 
as “a leader of the conservative intellectual renaissance” and a man with “well known” conservative  views, though 
journalist Adam Liptak acknowledges that political conservatives were “not always” pleased with the judicial 
outcomes flowing from Scalia’s adherence to originalism. However, Liptak mainly focuses on the decisions Scalia 
was involved in in the realm of Fourth Amendment criminal procedure, which effectively gave more rights to criminal 
defendants. Liptak goes on to discuss Scalia’s ties to conservative power brokers like Charles Koch and conservative 
legal groups like the Federalist Society.  
90 While Justice Blackmun was appointed to the Court by Republican President Richard Nixon, Blackmun is one of 
the most well-established liberals in the Court’s history, writing for the majority in arguably the most liberal opinion 
ever handed down by the Court, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
91 Smith, 494 U.S. at 907-08 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (“Such a statute may stand only if the law in general, and the 
State’s refusal to allow a religious exemption in particular, are justified by a compelling interes t that cannot be 
served by less restrictive means. Until today, I thought this was a settled and inviolate principle of this Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence.”). 
92 Id. at 909-19. 
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Oregon of being religiously intolerant, warning that if Oregon continues to be hostile towards 
religions, as Blackmun saw the law at issue was, those religions may “migrate to some other and 
more tolerant region.”93 
Certainly, a liberal Justice dissenting to an Antonin Scalia majority opinion should come 
as no surprise to those who understand the politics inherent in Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Perhaps the more surprising opinion comes from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Smith, wherein the infamous conservative Justice disagreed with the new framework established 
by the majority opinion. Justice O’Connor, in agreement with Justice Blackmun, argued that even 
neutral laws of general applicability can impose a burden on an individual’s practice of religion if 
the law prevents a person from engaging in religiously motivated conduct or requires a person to 
engage in conduct forbidden by his or her religion.94 Unlike Blackmun, though, O’Connor 
concurred in the opinion because she would have held that Oregon could meet the strict scrutiny 
standard, showing a compelling governmental interest that was narrowly tailored to meet its ends.95 
Justice O’Connor, through her Smith concurrence, laid the groundwork for conservative 
disfavor of the Smith decision. Justice O’Connor again reinforced her aversion for Smith through 
her dissenting opinion in the aforementioned Flores case. In clear terms, Justice O’Connor stated 
that the sudden transformation of the Free Exercise Clause, as represented by the Court’s decision 
in Smith, “harmed religious liberty[.]”96 
While the opinions of Justices Blackmun and O’Connor provide important background for 
this topic, as they show that Smith was a controversial decision from the time it was handed down 
in 1990, those opinions admittedly have little bearing on the Court today. However, there is no 
 
93 Id. at 919-20, quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218. 
94 Id. at 893-95 (O’Connor, J. concurring). 
95 Id. at 905-06. 
96 Flores, 521 U.S. at 547 (O’Connor, J. dissenting). 
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shortage of disdain for Smith amongst the current members of the Court. The best noted 
dissatisfaction with Smith may come from the Court’s most tenured conservative voice, Justice 
Samuel Alito. In his majority opinion in Holt v Hobbs, a challenge to a State prison’s denial of 
religious accommodation for Muslim inmates, Justice Alito acknowledged that “Smith largely 
repudiated the method of analysis used in prior free exercise cases[,]” and that RFRA was a direct 
answer to Smith, “to provide greater protection for religious exercise. . . .”97 Justice Alito, prior to 
Holt, ruled in favor of such expansive religious freedoms in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.98, 
where Alito characterized RFRA as  “striking [a] sensible balance[] between religious liberty and 
competing prior governmental interests.” In so finding, the Court held that a decision by the 
Department of Health and Human Services to mandate contraception coverage under an employer-
sponsored health plan was unlawful under RFRA.99 
It is also worth noting that, aside from the conservative voices on the Court, conservative 
legal scholars have also shown their dismay at Justice Scalia’s holding in Smith. Former Circuit 
Judge Michael W. McConnell100 has expressed his disappointment with the Smith decision, even 
going as far as to say that the Smith decision has no logical basis in First Amendment 
jurisprudence. The very same year the Smith decision came down, McConnell authored Free 
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, published in the University of Chicago Law 
Review.101 In the article, McConnell discusses what he believes is a bipartisan consensus that 
Smith was decided inappropriately, stating that: 
The Smith decision is undoubtedly the most important development in the law of 
 
97 574 U.S. 352, 357 (2015). 
98 573 U.S. 682, 735-36 (2014). 
99 Id. at 736. 
100 McConnell is the Professor and Director of the Constitutional Law Center at Stanford Law School. McConnell also 
served as a Circuit Judge on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for a decade after being appointed by Republican 
President George W. Bush. McConnell specializes in issues related to religion and the First Amendment. See “Michael 
W. McConnell: Biography”. https://law.stanford.edu/directory/michael-w-mcconnell/#slsnav-policy-practicum.  
101 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109 (1990). 
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religious freedom in decades. Already is has stimulated a petition for rehearing 
joined by an unusually broadbased coalition of religious and civil liberties groups 
from right to left and over a hundred constitutional law scholars, among them 
myself, which proved futile, as well as a drive for legislative correction, which is 
presently under consideration in Congress. Free exercise is no longer wanting for 
controversy.102 
 
McConnell goes on to accuse the majority opinion in Smith of failing to present any argument to 
back its claim that free exercise exemptions “contradict[] both constitutional tradition and common 
sense[,]”103 and instead the Court “substitutes a bare requirement for formal neutrality” not strictly 
advanced by the plain language of the Constitution.104 
The most recent conservative voices to join the Court prior to the appointment of Justice 
Amy Coney Barrett by President Trump this October, Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, 
have also shown a disfavoring of Smith through some of their first decisions on the Court. In 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Gorsuch acknowledged in his concurring opinion that “Smith 
remains controversial in many quarters.”105 In another recent signal by the conservative-wing of 
the Court that Smith’s days may be numbered, Justice Alito penned a concurrence to the Court’s 
decision to deny certiorari in Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,106 where a high school football 
coach brought suit alleging retaliation by the School District for his exercise of his First 
Amendment rights by engaging in demonstrative prayer on the football field in the presence of 
students immediately after games.107 Justice Alito wrote the concurrence in Kennedy, and was 
joined by the other prominent conservative voices on the Court, Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and 
Thomas. In what is perhaps Alito’s most scathing show of aversion to Smith, he wrote that “[i]n 
 
102 Id. at 1111. 
103 Id. at 1152. 
104 Id. 
105 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S.Ct. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J. concurring). 
106 139 S.Ct. 634 (2019). 
107 See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 815-19 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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[Smith], the Court drastically cut back on the protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause…. 
In this case, however, we have not been asked to revisit that decision.”108 
Just this year, in denying certiorari in the case of Davis v. Ermold,109 Justice Thomas, 
joined by Justice Alito, signaled that both Obergefell and Smith are ripe for revisitation. In a 
footnote, Thomas wrote that “[a]s a result of Smith, accommodations for those with sincerely held 
religious beliefs have generally been viewed as the domain of positive state and federal law[,]”110 
to seemingly lament the fact that the Court has chosen in recent years to expand protections for 
those whose lifestyles do not comport with religious ones, while ignoring the rights of those 
religious individuals under the First Amendment.  
In a not-so-veiled manner, Justice Alito’s concurrence signals what conservative jurists and 
scholars have been hinting at for decades: Smith is ripe to be overturned, the Court is just waiting 
for the opportunity to do just that. Fulton, however, presents the Court with that opportunity. 
b. The Stage Is Set For Fulton 
In light of the ideological leaning of the Supreme Court, coupled with the signals flares 
that have already been fired by at least three Justices currently presiding on the Court, the stage is 
set for the Court to overturn its Smith framework through its upcoming decision in Fulton. As 
previously discussed, Fulton presents a challenge by a religious group to a Philadelphia city rule 
which, on its face, appears to be a neutral law of general applicability. As recognized by the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals, Petitioners CSS rely on the Court’s holding in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
arguing that the Philadelphia law was not, in fact, a neutral law, but rather one that was motivated 
by ill-will towards a religious group, or that it impermissibly targeted Petitioners based on their 
 
108 Kennedy, 139 S.Ct. at 637 (Alito, J. concurring). 
109 No. 19-926, 2020 WL 5881537 (Oct. 5, 2020). 
110 Id. at *2 n. *. 
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religious views.111 As the Third Circuit recognized: 
CSS’s theme devolves to this: the City is targeting CSS because it discriminates 
against same-sex couples; CSS is discriminating against same-sex couples because 
of its religious beliefs; therefore the City is targeting CSS for its religious beliefs. 
But this syllogism is as flawed as it is dangerous. It runs directly counter to the 
premise of Smith that, while religious belief is always protected, religiously 
motivated conduct enjoys no special protections of exemption from general, 
neutrally applied legal requirements. That CSS’s conduct springs from sincerely 
held and strongly felt religious beliefs does not imply that the City’s desire to 
regulate that conduct springs from antipathy to those beliefs.112 
 
The strong language employed by the Third Circuit is a valid interpretation of this issue 
under Smith. However, the Supreme Court need not give any deference to the Third Circuit, as it 
will review the decision not to grant a preliminary injunction, and the court’s interpretation of 
Smith, de novo.113 
For the following three reasons, the Court will probably use Fulton as an opportunity to 
overrule the Smith Free Exercise framework: 
1. The Court’s Make-Up 
It is no secret that, following the death of the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the 
appointment of Justice Amy Coney Barrett to the Court, the Supreme Court ideologically leans 
substantially to the right. While an argument can be made that the Court was evenly balanced prior 
to the death of Justice Ginsburg, with Chief Justice John Roberts being the “moderate” swing vote, 
same is no longer the case with the appointment of Justice Barrett. Joining Justices Thomas, Alito, 
Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh as another conservative voice on the Court114, the conservative wing of 
 
111 See Fulton, 922 F.3d at 153-54. 
112 Id. at 159. 
113 See id. at 152 (in a case implicating the First Amendment, the appeals court does not rely on the normal clear-error 
standard for factual findings, but instead conducts an independent examination of the record as a whole, deferring to 
the district court’s findings only insofar as they concern witness credibility). 
114 Aside from the fact that Justice Barrett was appointed by a Republican President and confirmed by the Senate 
without the vote of a single Democratic Senator, Justice Barrett has also been described as “a favorite of Christian 
conservatives,” and notably drew criticism from Democratic Senators after sidestepping questions on liberal issues, 
such as abortion, presidential powers, climate change, voting rights, and the Affordable Care Act, during her 
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the Court now has a clear 5-3 majority, assuming Chief Justice Roberts is still considered the 
“moderate” voice on the Court given its new make-up.115 
While Smith was written by the notoriously conservative Antonin Scalia, the decision has 
met nothing but blowback from conservative jurists and scholars since its publishing in April, 
1990. While there is no clear and convincing evidence that the aforementioned Justices will hold 
that Smith’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is incorrect under the standard of the First 
Amendment, circumstantial evidence points towards that being the safest bet you can make. 
Moreover, several Justices on the Court have already implied that this is the way they will rule. 
2. The Disfavor of Smith Among Current Justices 
As previously mentioned, the Court’s conservatives have been openly hostile towards the 
Smith framework, as clearly evidenced by Justice Alito’s concurrence in the Court’s decision to 
deny certiorari in Kennedy and Justice Thomas’ opinion respecting the denial of certiorari in 
Davis. Justice Alito did not mince words in that concurrence, stating that Smith “drastically cut 
back” on the protections afforded to the religious under the Free Exercise Clause, and then openly 
acknowledging that Kennedy did not present a case where the Court was asked to revisit that 
precedent.116 Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joining Alito in that concurrence is 
effectively a co-signing of those sentiments. Kennedy did not present the issue to the Court, nor 
did it present an idea factual scenario for directly targeting Smith; Fulton, on the other hand, does. 
 
 
confirmation hearing. See Richard Cowan, Trump plans second White House event for Barrett as Senate vote looms, 
Oct. 26, 2020. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-court-barrett/senate-likely-to-confirm-barrett-to-u-s-
supreme-court-cementing-conservative-majority-idUKKBN27B139.  
115 This assumption is admittedly tenuous considering Chief Justice Roberts’ scathing dissent in Obergefell, where he 
criticized the majority opinion for ignoring the rights of religious individuals under the Free Exercise Clause and 
ominously predicted that the merits of both Obergefell and Smith would be before the Court again in the near future 
in an example highly analogous to the facts presented in Fulton. See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 711-12 (Roberts, C.J. 
dissenting). 
116 Kennedy, 139 S.Ct. at 637. 
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3. A Chance For New Precedent 
Regardless of the disfavor of Smith among conservatives or the ideological leaning of the 
Court, the Court cannot make new precedent on its own volition. Rather, it needs the operative set 
of facts along with the relevant issue to be presented to it in a given case. Fulton provides the Court 
that opportunity. Fulton deals with a Free Exercise challenge to a statute which, on its face, is a 
neutral law of general applicability. The Circuit Court used the Smith framework to find that no 
exception exists for the Petitioner. The opportunity for the conservative majority to finally abandon 
the Smith framework is here, and a potential Fulton decision overruling Smith would be a major 
win for religious freedom under the First Amendment. However, with a win for religious freedom 
comes a potential loss for the LGBTQ community. 
On November 4, 2020, the Court heard oral arguments from the parties in Fulton. In what 
may seem like a positive development for both the City of Philadelphia and the LGBTQ 
community, Chief Justice Roberts seemed to imply that the City should have the leeway to strike 
a balance between the rights of religious groups and LGBTQ couples in enacting its adoption 
ordinances.117 However, that hope should be tempered by the fact that Justice Alito (and Justice 
Thomas to a lesser extent) seemed very sympathetic towards CSS, even going so far as to state to 
City attorney Neal Katyal, “if we are honest about what’s really going on here,’ the case is ‘not 
about ensuring that same-sex couples in Philadelphia have the opportunity to be foster parents.’ 
Rather, Alito contended, Philadelphia “can’t stand the message that Catholic Social Services and 
the archdiocese are sending by continuing to adhere to the old-fashioned view about marriage.’”118 
Regardless of the signaling by Roberts during oral arguments, Alito’s words likely give a 
 
117 See Amy Howe, Argument analysis: Justices sympathetic to faith-based foster-care agency in anti-discrimination 
dispute, SCOTUSblog, Nov. 4, 2020, https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/11/argument -analysis-justices-sympathetic-
to-faith-based-foster-care-agency-in-anti-discrimination-dispute/. 
118 Id. 
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more accurate depiction of how the Court leans as a whole in the case of Fulton. Even if Roberts 
shies away from the strong language used in his Obergefell dissent, and rules in favor the City, it 
will still not be enough to defeat the probable five-vote conservative majority that will come down 
on the side of CSS. 
III. The Possible Fallout from the Court’s Upcoming Fulton Decision 
While Fulton is not a direct battle between the rights of the religious and the rights of 
LGBTQ individuals, the case does implicate both. The Court’s potential abrogation of Smith 
would certainly have wide-ranging consequences that go beyond the rights of LGBTQ individuals, 
as evidenced by the Smith decision itself. An overruling of Smith would significantly restrain the 
ability for States to enforce neutral laws of general applicability against claims brought under the 
Free Exercise Clause, barring the showing of a compelling state interest and a narrowly tailored 
law, a difficult burden to meet.119 The burden on the State, and the expanded potential for religious 
exemption from neutrally applicable laws, could mean a restricting of rights for LGBTQ 
individuals. 
a. The Potential Constraint On LGBTQ Rights 
As evidenced by Fulton, the overruling of Smith could have negative consequences for the 
LGBTQ community.120 However, the field of adoption and foster care is not the only area where 
LGBTQ individuals may experience a restriction on rights. For an expansive list of the areas where 
this might affect LGBTQ individuals, one can look at the First Amendment Defense  Act 
(hereinafter referred to as “FADA”). FADA is a bill121 that was introduced into the United States 
 
119 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 226 (1992) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (stating the “core premises of strict 
scrutiny” is “that the heavy burden of justification is on the State”) (emphasis added). 
120 A finding for Petitioner CSS would mean that Respondent Philadelphia can no longer require adoption agencies to 
adopt on an “all-comers” basis, thus narrowing the avenues from which LGBTQ couples have the ability to adopt 
children. 
121 First Amendment Defense Act, S. 2525, 115th Cong. (2018). 
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Senate in 2018. According to the bill, FADA’s purpose is: 
[t]o ensure that the Federal Government shall not take any discriminatory action 
against a person, wholly or partially on the basis that such person speaks, or acts, 
in accordance with a sincerely held religious belief or moral conviction that 
marriage is or should be recognized as a union of one man and one woman, or two 
individuals as recognized under Federal law, or that sexual relations outside 
marriage are improper.122 
 
 FADA goes on to list several situations wherein religious freedom may be implicated and, 
under the law, exemption would be required. Specifically, the bill states that government may not 
discriminate against individuals fitting into the aforementioned definition in the following ways: 
(1) federal tax treatment; (2) deductions for charitable giving; (3) withholding federal grants; (4) 
withholding federal benefit programs; and (5) withholding entitlement to Federal 
property.123FADA also requires Government to recognize the accredited, licensed, or certified 
status of individuals so recognized currently under Federal law.124 
 Like RFRA, FADA would be a major victory for religious individuals, namely those who 
do not agree with the lifestyles of the LGBTQ community. FADA ensures public funding for 
organizations and individuals who are openly opposed to the rights of LGBTQ individuals to marry 
within their own sex. In other words, FADA gives organizations similar to Catholic Social Services 
the assurance that they will not lose Federal funding if they act in a manner which evinces their 
sincerely held religious belief that marriage is exclusively between one man and one woman.  
b. The Court May Feel Emboldened To Revisit Its Decision In Obergefell. 
Though not directly related, the Court’s decision to overturn Smith and strengthen the free 
exercise of religion under the First Amendment may be the first domino to fall in a line of decisions 
expanding religious rights. Considering the Court’s ideological make-up, the upcoming Fulton 
 
122 S. 2525, 115th Cong. (2018). 
123 Id. at § 3(b)(1)-(5). 
124 Id. at § 3(c). 
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decision could embolden the Court to revisit its landmark ruling in Obergefell, thus giving States 
the right to deny same-sex couples from getting married. Though the potential revisitation is 
speculative, the Court has signaled that the speculation is justified. Like Justice Alito’s 
concurrence in Kennedy may signal the intent to overturn Smith, Justice Clarence Thomas recently 
wrote a concurring opinion in the Court’s decision to deny certiorari in Davis.125  
The Petitioner Kim Davis gained national notoriety when she, as a county clerk in 
Kentucky, denied a marriage license to a same-sex couple based on her sincerely held religious 
belief that marriage is between a man and a woman.126 Davis was sued for her refusal, and lost a 
motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity at the Sixth Circuit.127 In rejecting the qualified 
immunity defense, the court cited the fact that same-sex marriage is now a clearly established right 
under Obergefell.128 In his concurrence respecting the Court’s denial of certiorari Justice Thomas 
acknowledged that this was the right decision, but also took umbrage with the fact that Obergefell 
effectively constrains the Free Exercise rights of religious individuals who oppose same-sex 
marriage.129 Thomas then stated that “[t]his petition [by Kim Davis] implicates important questions 
about the scope of our decision in Obergefell, but it does not cleanly present them.”130 Like Justice 
Alito in Kennedy, the language utilized by Justice Thomas indicates that Obergefell may be ripe 
for revisiting, but the Court is willing to wait for the right set of circumstances to do so. 
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127 See Ermold v. Davis, 936 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2019). 
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